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The Tort-Proof Plaintiff 
THE DRUNK IN THE AUTOMOBILE, CRASHWORTHINESS 
CLAIMS, AND THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS 
Ellen M. Bublick† 
State courts face a difficult challenge when they review 
crashworthiness claims that arise in conjunction with drunk driving. 
Under ordinary doctrines of crashworthiness, if a product defect causes 
enhanced injury, the product seller is subject to liability for the enhanced 
portion of the injury.1 For example, if an airbag fails to deploy during a 
car accident, the car maker may be required to compensate for increased 
injury caused by the defect.2  
At the same time, courts are increasingly asked to apportion 
responsibility among all tortfeasors involved in a single injury. Although 
apportionment traditionally included only negligent torts, in the last 
decade a growing number of states have expanded the divisors to include 
strict liability, recklessness, and even intentional torts.3  
In a claim involving both crashworthiness and drunk driving the 
two sets of doctrines—crashworthiness liability and comparative 
apportionment—appear set for a collision course. The liability that one 
doctrine provides, the other takes away. The mechanism through which 
this conflict is created works as follows: juries in crashworthiness cases 
involving drunk drivers are asked to determine the defendants’ liability 
to the plaintiff, but also are asked to compare the responsibility of the car 
maker that produced the defective airbag with that of the drunk driver 
  
 †  Dan B. Dobbs Professor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of 
Law. Thanks to Aaron Twerski for inviting me to consider this engaging topic, and to Anita 
Bernstein and the Brooklyn Law School for hosting this thought-provoking conference. Thanks also 
to Barbara Atwood, Kathie Barnes, Mark Geistfeld, Mark Jacobs, Ellen Jacobs and Brent White for 
comments on an earlier draft, to Tim Reppucci for his excellent research assistance, and to the 
editors of the Brooklyn Law Review for their careful work. 
 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 16(a) (1998). In certain cases, if 
proof does not support determination of the enhanced harm, the manufacturer may be liable for all of 
plaintiff’s harm. Id. § 16(c). 
 2 See, e.g., Estep v. Mike Ferrell Ford Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 672 S.E.2d 345, 355 (W. 
Va. 2008) (holding that evidence by engineer was sufficient to support finding that truck in which 
airbag failed to deploy during accident was defective); Batiste v. General Motors Corp., 802 So. 2d 
686, 689-90 (La. App. 2001) (holding that expert testimony was required to show that properly 
functioning airbag would have deployed and res ipsa loquitur did not apply).  
 3 See generally Ellen M. Bublick, The End Game of Tort Reform: Comparative 
Apportionment and Intentional Torts, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 355, 364-67 (2003) (tracking the 
development of comparative apportionment).  
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who caused the initial accident. Given a comparative metric that uses 
fault as a central measure4 and requires zero-sum trade-offs of 
responsibility, the moral blame inherent in a reckless tort like drunk 
driving may simply swamp the apportionment process. Even if a jury 
finds that the manufacturer’s product is not crashworthy and that the 
defective product led to enhanced injury, the product seller’s liability 
may be buried under the moral blame assigned to the drunk driver in the 
apportionment.  
Accordingly, crashworthiness cases involving drunk drivers 
present one instance of a crucial but newly configured challenge in tort 
law: how to preserve the structural accountability of negligent and 
strictly liable tortfeasors within an apportionment system that is not only 
dominated by several liability, but for the first time in the long history of 
tort law, apportions responsibility not only to negligent actors but to 
strictly liable, reckless, and intentional wrongdoers as well.  
The problem of preserving structural accountability after strict 
liability, reckless, and intentional torts are added to the comparative 
apportionment mix is not a problem exclusive to the case of the drunk 
driver and the automobile.5 Indeed, the concern permeates many contexts 
in which the high moral blame of one actor can unmake the systemic 
responsibility for care of another.6 Nevertheless, vanishing structural 
liability—creating tort-proof plaintiffs through apportionment—is well-
illustrated by and inadequately addressed in this setting.   
The term “tort-proof plaintiff” recalls an analogous doctrine 
from mid-1970s defamation law: the libel-proof plaintiff. The libel-proof 
plaintiff was a person whose reputation was so poor that even actionable 
false and defamatory statements heaped on could not count as extra 
damage.7 When a drunk driver is the crashworthiness plaintiff, the tort-
proof plaintiff analogy is most complete. When the plaintiff’s 
misconduct is highly blameworthy in itself, as in the case of drunk 
driving, why should even actionable manufacturer negligence give rise to 
a cause of action to any significant degree? The answer, of course, 
depends on the nature of the interest that the tort law seeks to protect. 
Are crashworthiness protections designed to benefit all drivers and 
passengers, even the negligent and reckless, or only those drivers and 
passengers who are exercising reasonable care for themselves?  
An extra wrinkle makes apportionment’s tort-proof plaintiff 
more difficult to dismiss than her defamation-proof kin. The tort-proof 
plaintiff in a crashworthiness case may not be the drunk driver, but rather 
the innocent victim of that driver. Even when the plaintiff with the failed 
  
 4 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 8 (2000). 
 5 See, e.g., Ellen M. Bublick, Upside Down? Terrorists, Proprietors and Civil 
Responsibility for Crime Prevention in the Post-9/11 Tort-Reform World, 41 LOYOLA L. REV. 1483, 
1518-28 (2008) (describing a related concern in the negligent security context).  
 6 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 14 (2000). 
 7 See Note, The Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1909, 1909 (1985). 
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airbag is the victim of the drunk driver, the plaintiff may find that, with 
respect to the manufacturer, she is tort-proof.8 Actionable misconduct of 
the manufacturer that causes the plaintiff injury, even severe injury, may 
not afford the plaintiff any significant cause of action against the 
manufacturer after responsibility has been apportioned.  
This result—recognizing crashworthiness liability but then 
realizing it only to the extent that the high moral blame of a drunk driver 
does not lay it to rest in the apportionment process—is not prescribed by 
any single legal rule, but rather stems from a combination of separate 
products liability rules and comparative apportionment rules. In fact, this 
combined approach appears to hold sway from the face of the three 
completed projects of the Restatement (Third) of Torts.9 
Yet courts concerned about preserving crashworthiness liability 
have crafted a doctrine that avoids apportioning away that liability. 
Specifically, in the ten years since the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability (“Restatement Third of Products”) was adopted, 
several state courts have embraced a doctrine that refuses to apportion 
liability between the crashworthiness defendant and the driver who 
occasioned the original crash.10  
In this Article, I argue that this court-created doctrine of non-
apportionment preserves the structural liability of manufacturers and 
provides incentives for baseline safety protections for product users as a 
whole. Courts have embraced the doctrine in two related but distinct 
contexts of crashworthiness and apportionment: cases in which a drunk 
driver hits the crashworthiness plaintiff and cases in which the drunk 
driver is the crashworthiness plaintiff. Each context raises somewhat 
different concerns and will be addressed in turn. 
Although state court decisions that refuse to apportion 
responsibility between those responsible for initial and secondary 
collisions appear on their face to reject the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 
at a deeper level, the decisions are quite consistent with Restatement 
principles. In particular, the state court decisions reflect two important 
types of ameliorative rules incorporated into the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Apportionment Liability (hereinafter Restatement Third of 
Apportionment) after the Restatement Third of Products was enacted—
  
 8 See, e.g., D’Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So. 2d 424, 427-28, 431-33 (Fla. 2001) 
(per curium) (acknowledging that the majority view is that “the fault of the plaintiff or a third party 
in causing the initial accident is recognized as a defense to a crashworthiness case against a product 
manufacturer”). 
 9  The term “Restatement Third of Torts” refers collectively to all of the segments of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts project. As of 2008, those projects include the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Products Liability, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, and the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical and Emotional Harm.  
 10 Gianinni v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:05CV244 (SRU), 2007 WL 3253731, at *3-*4 (D. 
Conn. Nov. 2, 2007) (holding that plaintiff negligence that leads to the underlying accident should 
not be available as a comparative fault defense to a crashworthiness claim); D’Amario, 806 So. 2d at 
433-35 (reviewing the reasoning behind cases that do not apportion between initial causes of the 
accident and crashworthiness claims and adopting the view that refusing to apportion is preferable). 
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defendant “very duty” rules and plaintiff “no-duty” rules. Defendant 
“very duty” rules define a defendant’s duty to use reasonable care to 
protect against specific types of risk.11 Plaintiff “no-duty” rules limit 
defenses of plaintiff comparative negligence based on special reasons of 
principle or policy.12  
Rather than urge courts to conform their decisions to the facially 
applicable doctrines of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, this Article 
urges the Restatement (Third) of Torts to confront more systematically 
the structural accountability issues that lie at the intersection of the 
Restatement projects but may have fallen in between them.  
I.  PRESERVING STRUCTURAL LIABILITY: MANUFACTURER 
CRASHWORTHINESS ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE VICTIM OF THE 
DRUNK DRIVER 
Perhaps the case that best illustrates the problem with the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts approach to comparative apportionment in 
crashworthiness cases is the Florida Supreme Court case, D’Amario v. 
Ford Motor Co.13 That case examined two consolidated claims.14 One 
was a claim filed by Maria Nash, who was driving to church with her 
two children when a drunk driver crossed over the center line and 
crashed head-on into her vehicle.15 Because the seatbelt in her Chevy 
Corsica failed, Nash’s head struck a metal post that separated the 
windshield from the driver’s door. Nash later died from her injuries.16 
Nash’s estate sued General Motors, the maker of her car, for “a design 
defect which had been discovered in the seatbelt of the 1990 Chevrolet 
Corsica.”17  
At trial against GM on the crashworthiness claim, Nash’s estate 
sought to exclude evidence of the other driver’s .15 blood alcohol 
content. According to the estate, the driver-intoxication information was 
irrelevant and prejudicial to the jury’s consideration of comparative 
fault.18 Despite the estate’s objection, the trial court ruled that the jury 
should apportion responsibility between General Motors and the drunk 
driver who hit Ms. Nash. Given this mandate to apportion responsibility, 
the court found that the jury should be permitted to hear evidence of the 
driver’s intoxication. When presented with that evidence at trial, the jury 
found no liability on the part of General Motors. On appeal, the estate 
  
 11  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 14 cmt. b (2000). 
  12  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 7 cmt. h (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 13 806 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2001).  
 14 Id. at 426-30 (addressing the claims of Clifford Harris and Maria Nash). 
 15 Id. at 429. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id.  
 18 Id. at 429-30. 
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argued that the evidence of the other motorist’s intoxication had been 
“unduly prejudicial to the issue of whether General Motors was negligent 
in designing a defective seatbelt.”19 
Before discussing the Florida Supreme Court’s disposition of the 
case, it is useful to examine the Restatement (Third) of Torts approach to 
the problem. That approach to apportionment in crashworthiness cases 
bridges two separate segments of the Restatement (Third) of Torts 
project—the Restatement Third of Products and the Restatement Third of 
Apportionment.  
The Restatement Third of Products adopts crashworthiness 
liability of manufacturers.20 When a product is defective at the time of 
commercial sale and the defect is “a substantial factor in increasing the 
plaintiff’s harm beyond that which would have resulted from other 
causes, the product seller is subject to liability for the increased harm.”21  
In cases in which harm is caused by multiple actors, as it nearly 
always is in crashworthiness cases, the Restatement Third of Products 
then provides a structure for two types of apportionment. First, causal 
apportionment is undertaken when proof supports a determination of the 
harm that would have resulted from other causes in the absence of the 
product defect.22 When causal apportionment cannot divide the harms, 
the crashworthiness defendant is either jointly and severally liable or 
severally liable for the harms, in accordance with the rules of the 
applicable jurisdiction.23 Next, the Restatement Third of Products leaves 
further apportionment of responsibility among multiple defendants to 
“generally applicable rules apportioning responsibility.”24 Those 
generally applicable rules of apportionment can be found in the 
Restatement Third of Apportionment. The Restatement Third of 
Apportionment instructs courts to apportion “responsibility” between all 
causes of action—intentional, reckless, negligent or strict liability—
according to a metric that compares fault and causation.25  
Given these combined rules, if a court wanted to follow the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts in Nash, it would first segregate any harm 
that the defendant could prove was attributable only to the drunk driver 
and not the manufacturer—harm that would have occurred even if Ms. 
Nash’s seatbelt had not failed. Liability for that harm would be assigned 
to the drunk driver alone. Then harm caused by both the drunk driver’s 
collision and the seatbelt’s failure—apparently, the plaintiff striking her 
head against the car and her ultimate death from the head injury—would 
  
 19 Id. at 430. 
 20 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 16 cmt. a (1998). 
 21 Id. § 16(a). 
 22 Id. § 16(b). 
 23 Id. § 16(d). 
 24 Id. § 17. 
 25 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 1 cmts. b, c (2000); 
id. § 8. 
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be left to local rules of joint and several or several liability. In most 
jurisdictions, including Florida, several liability typically would apply.26 
Accordingly, whatever percentage of the remaining responsibility was 
assigned to other parties in the action, GM would not be required to pay.  
With respect to the responsibility apportionment, the 
Restatement Third of Apportionment would in turn advise a jurisdiction 
to compare the responsibility of all actors involved in the crash, whether 
strictly liable, negligent, reckless, or intentional.27 Under this approach, a 
jury would be instructed to hear evidence regarding each party’s fault 
and assign percentages of responsibility for the harm in turn. In this case, 
the jury would assign responsibility to the drunk driver and the car 
manufacturer respectively. These percentage assignments would be 
required to equal 100%. The factors that the jury would be instructed to 
use in its responsibility assignment include “the nature of the person’s 
risk creating conduct” and “the strength of the causal connection” 
between that conduct and the harm.28 
After testimony, the jury might assign percentages of 
responsibility to the two defendants in a few different ways. First, a jury 
asked to weigh the risk-creating conduct of drunk driving against the 
risk-creating conduct of negligent seatbelt design or manufacture might 
assign most or all of the responsibility to the reckless drunk driver based 
on a calculus of moral blame. The zero-liability ruling in Nash may have 
been a result of such a comparative calculation. Of course, the reverse is 
also possible. A jury could assign more responsibility to the 
manufacturer responsible for the car’s defect than it did to the drunk 
driver. In either scenario, the apportionment result presents some 
significant problems.  
If juries weight apportionments heavily toward the morally 
blameworthy misconduct of drunk driving, apportionment becomes a 
back-door route to eliminate crashworthiness liability in a significant 
percentage of cases. Just how significant the apportionment-based 
reduction might be is suggested by Center for Disease Control estimates 
that drunk driving causes nearly a third of all vehicle fatalities.29 The 
evisceration of crashworthiness liability in such a large percentage of 
claims threatens the very purpose of imposing crashworthiness liability 
as an initial matter.  
  
 26 See id. § 17, at 151-59; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81 (West 2009).  
 27 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 8 (2000). 
 28 Id. 
 29 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, NHTSA, DOT HS 810 801, TRAFFIC 
SAFETY FACTS 2006 DATA: ALCOHOL IMPAIRED DRIVING 1 (2008), available at http://www-
nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/810801.PDF (alcohol-related traffic fatalities account for 32% of all traffic 
fatalities in the United States); Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Dep’t of Health and Human 
Servs., Impaired Driving, http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/factsheets/drving.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2009) 
(noting that drugs other than alcohol are involved in 18% of motor vehicle driver deaths).  
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The purpose of crashworthiness liability is described by the 
Restatement Third of Products as follows: “[a]lthough accidents are not 
intended uses of products, they are generally foreseeable. A 
manufacturer has a duty to design and manufacture its product so as 
reasonably to reduce the foreseeable harm that may occur in an accident 
brought about by causes other than a product defect.”30 To the extent that 
crashworthiness liability is designed to require manufacturers to reduce 
damage in foreseeable collisions, that liability must allow for collisions 
caused by drunk driving, which are constantly if tragically foreseeable.31 
If apportionment eviscerates crashworthiness liability in the large 
percentage of accidents caused by drunk driving, manufacturers’ duty 
will demand little institutional attention. To the extent that 
crashworthiness liability promotes vehicle safety, diminution of liability 
may produce significant reductions in vehicle safety protections. Also, 
while crashworthiness liability plus comparative apportionment might 
net a no-liability or small-liability rule, the uncertain process of 
apportionment may result in large litigation costs on the path to that 
limited return—a lose-lose situation for manufacturers and injured 
consumers.  
Though sold as a means for holding manufacturers liable only 
for their own fault or for the harm that they caused, apportionment does 
neither. Apportionment mechanisms in drunk driving cases do not 
exonerate car manufacturers based on the manufacturers’ own right 
conduct, but based on the additional culpable misconduct of a drunk 
driver. Imagine a driver injured by a collision in which his airbag fails to 
inflate because of a product defect. The driver suffers enhanced physical 
injuries valued at $100,000. If the cause of the car accident was not 
negligence, perhaps bad weather, the driver might recover in full from 
the manufacturer. If the accident was instead caused by another driver’s 
negligent act, perhaps looking away from the roadway, the driver might 
recover a portion of the damages from the manufacturer, perhaps 50%, or 
$50,000. Yet if the accident was caused by a drunk driver, a large 
percentage of responsibility, perhaps 90%, might be assigned to the 
drunk. Consequently, the victim might recover only one tenth of any 
enhanced injury from the manufacturer. In each case, the manufacturer 
created the same defective product which resulted in the same enhanced 
injury to the victim. In each case, the victim acted without fault. And yet, 
the victim of the drunk driver, by virtue of being the victim of both a 
reckless and a negligent actor, becomes tort-proof.  
It might be argued that the Restatement (Third) of Torts itself did 
not create the inconsistency in the previous scenario. One way to resolve 
  
 30 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 16 cmt. a (1998). 
 31 Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., National 
Drunk and Drugged Driving Prevention Month, http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/duip/spotlite/3d.htm (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2009) (stating that three in every ten Americans will be involved in an alcohol related 
crash in their lifetimes). 
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the problem would be through state-enacted legislation embracing joint 
and several liability in the case of single, indivisible harms. Yet this 
argument glosses over the role the Restatement Third of Apportionment 
played in dramatically magnifying the problem by adding strict liability, 
recklessness, and intentional torts to the apportionment mix after several 
liability was firmly established as the rule in most U.S. jurisdictions. 
Adding highly blameworthy conduct to the apportionment threatens the 
underlying structural liability more consistently, and to a far greater 
degree, than did previous comparisons because of the high moral blame 
associated with that conduct. Moreover, adding strict liability and 
specifically crashworthiness liability to the apportionment calculations 
broadens the possibility that liability imposed to assure structural safety 
will be undermined by the apportionment process.   
In the years after crashworthiness liability was adopted but 
before comparative apportionment included torts beyond negligence, 
juries would not have been asked to apportion responsibility between the 
drunk driver and the manufacturer for either of two reasons. The first 
reason was the existence of joint and several liability. However, a second 
reason for absence of apportionment in these cases was the fact that 
intentional and reckless torts (and even at one point strict products 
liability) were not included in comparative fault systems.  
Confronted with the concern that adding others’ highly 
blameworthy conduct to comparative apportionment calculations will 
eviscerate defendants’ duties of care, some courts have sustained jury 
verdicts that assign more responsibility to the negligent or strictly liable 
defendant than to the reckless or intentional tortfeasor.32 Under these 
rulings, a jury in a case like Nash could say that GM had 90% of the 
overall responsibility given its defective seatbelt, while the drunk driver 
shared only 10% of the total. Although upholding these institution-heavy 
apportionments may be a second-best solution for courts that want to 
preserve structural liability,33 those counterintuitive judgments also raise 
problems. In particular, allowing jurors to assign the full range of 
possible percentages of responsibility in a given case can magnify 
inconsistencies between the outcomes of different juries. Moreover, the 
normative statement of a jury in this case seems so contrary to public 
understanding of fault that the verdicts might further erode support for 
the tort system. Courts of appeal must then struggle with the question of 
whether such results can be justified under fault-based metrics, or 
whether, perhaps, these comparative metrics can be understood in a way 
that is not entirely fault-based.34 
  
 32 See, e.g., Nash v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 856 N.Y.S.2d 583, 586-88 (App. Div. 
2008). 
 33  Bublick, supra note 5, at 1530-43. 
 34  See, e.g., Nash, 856 N.Y.S.2d at 586-88. 
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Courts that want to retain crashworthiness liability but not face 
the vagaries endemic to an “any-apportionment-calculation-goes” system 
may refuse altogether to apportion responsibility in crashworthiness 
cases. This is the approach ultimately taken by the Florida Supreme 
Court in D’Amario. The D’Amario court held that “the principles of 
comparative fault involving the causes of the first collision do not 
generally apply to crashworthiness cases.”35  
In reaching its determination, the court placed great weight on 
the purpose of crashworthiness liability and the concern that 
apportionment in this context would reduce or obliterate the defendant’s 
duty.36 The court drew an analogy to medical malpractice cases, in which 
an injury that occasioned the need for treatment is not apportioned with a 
doctor’s subsequent negligent care.37 Finally, the court rejected the 
specific argument that drunk driving falls into the state’s statutory 
intentional tort exception to comparative fault; drunk driving falls short 
of purpose or substantial certainty of harm—a necessary element of an 
intentional tort.38 Nevertheless, the court found the intentional tort 
exception analogous to the concern presented in the case of 
apportionment and drunk driving.39 The court expressed concern that 
without an exception to apportionment where the other defendant was a 
drunk driver, defendants were “permitted to effectively shift the focus of 
the trial from the existence of a defect to the driver’s conduct in driving 
while intoxicated, even though the existence of a defect was the 
fundamental liability issue to be tried in these cases.”40 Accordingly, the 
court ruled that the trial court’s focus on the evidence of drunk driving in 
Nash unduly confused the issues in the case. It therefore upheld the 
intermediate court’s reversal of that ruling.41  
Although the Restatement (Third) of Torts does not formally 
embrace the doctrine cited in D’Amario, principles from the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts lend support to that decision. The support stems from 
changes to the Restatement Third of Apportionment made after the 
Restatement Third of Products was adopted in 1997. At the time the 
Restatement Third of Products was enacted, the Restatement Third of 
Apportionment sought comparison of intentional, reckless, negligent, and 
strict liability torts without any ameliorative rules to blunt the effects of 
the assessment.42 The effects of unmitigated apportionment doctrines on 
  
 35 D’Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So.2d 424, 441 (Fla. 2001). 
 36 Id. at 434. 
 37 Id. at 436-37. 
 38 Id. at 438-39. 
 39 Id. at 439 n.15. 
 40 Id. at 441. 
 41 Id. at 441-42. 
 42  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. 9-23 (Proposed 
Changes to Proposed Final Draft, 1998) (proposing to “[i]nsert the following new section [24.1]” 
entitled “Tortfeasors with a Specific Duty to Protect the Plaintiff From an Intentional Tort”). 
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substantive tort law subsequently became a flashpoint of controversy 
surrounding the Restatement Third of Apportionment. Although that 
Restatement had endeavored to leave “‘first-order’ questions involving 
the basic rules of liability” out of the Restatement and address only 
“second-order” questions of apportionment, the Reporters conceded that 
the “line between first-order and second-order issues has been difficult to 
maintain.”43  
Consequently, the Reporters subsequently crafted additional 
black letter rules to preserve “first-order” rules of substantive liability. 
One of the most important of these ameliorative rules protected 
negligence liability in cases involving highly blameworthy intentional 
tortfeasor defendants. In particular, Restatement Third of Apportionment 
section 14 made tortfeasors jointly and severally liable for “failure to 
protect the [plaintiff] from the specific risk of an intentional tort.”44 
Under this rule, for example, if a defendant’s duty was to provide 
adequate security to prevent a criminal attack, the defendant that 
provided negligent security could not apportion responsibility against the 
criminal assailant. 
The Restatement Reporters justified this rule on the ground that 
application of comparative responsibility in the context of intentional 
tortfeasors and several liability creates “a difficult problem.”45 
Specifically, “the great culpability of the intentional tortfeasor may lead 
a factfinder to assign the bulk of responsibility for the harm to the 
intentional tortfeasor,” leaving the negligent tortfeasor with little liability 
and the injured plaintiff with little compensation.46  
Because the rule is limited to intentional torts, section 14 would 
not directly address the problem of drunk driving. Moreover, to the 
extent that the Restatement Third of Apportionment’s ameliorative rule is 
premised on an intentional tortfeasor’s likely insolvency, the context of 
drunk driving may differ because some forms of insurance coverage may 
be available. Nevertheless, as the Florida Supreme Court noted, the 
concern for apportionment in the context of intentional torts shares many 
similar facets with the concern about apportionment in the context of 
drunk driving. Specifically, courts are appropriately concerned that the 
second-order rules of apportionment will have too great an effect on the 
first-order issues of crashworthiness liability.  
The Restatement Third of Apportionment itself acknowledges 
that the ameliorative rule for intentional torts might appropriately stretch 
beyond the intentional torts context. Specifically, Restatement Third of 
Apportionment commentary suggests that there may be situations in 
  
 43 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 1, Reporters’ Note 
cmt. a (2000). 
 44 Id. § 14. 
 45 Id. § 14 cmt b. 
 46 Id. 
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which courts “extend the rule stated in this Section to those who fail to 
protect against less than intentional tortious conduct.”47 Apropos of the 
concern that drunk driving might present a case of high moral blame akin 
to an intentional tort, the Restatement Third of Apportionment lists 
negligent-entrustment and dram-shop liability in its list of potential 
extensions to the category. 
Yet while adoption of the D’Amario ruling and an extension of 
Restatement Third of Apportionment section 14 would lead to similar 
results in the Nash case, the two approaches would yield somewhat 
different answers in other instances. Specifically, D’Amario would 
prevent apportionment in crashworthiness law regardless of the cause of 
the initial accident. That would preclude apportionment between a drunk 
driver and the car company in Nash, but it would also preclude 
apportionment between a careless driver and the car maker. As such, 
apportionment would be barred not only when it might eviscerate 
crashworthiness liability, but when it might merely reduce it. Also, under 
D’Amario, evidence of intoxication would be irrelevant to the case 
because no apportionment between the parties would be required. Under 
an extension of the Restatement Third of Apportionment Rule 14, on the 
other hand, a multi-party apportionment would still be made. However, 
under Restatement Rule 14, after the apportionment, the negligent 
defendant might be jointly and severally liable for the harm indivisibly 
caused by the manufacturer’s defect and the drunk driver’s misconduct.48 
This latter approach of the Restatement might be easier to apply in the 
context of a multiple-party action.49 It also might better address the 
concern that apportioning between initial and second collisions is more 
of a legal fiction than a real description of separate injuries.50  
Although these two solutions to the problem of preserving 
crashworthiness liability in cases of drunk driving are attractive, other 
solutions are equally plausible. For example, a special exception to 
apportionment rules might be designed for crashworthiness cases, which 
almost always involve another underlying accident. A different option 
would be to fix manufacturer reductions for the other driver’s fault at a 
constant percentage (as is done in cases involving driver failure to wear a 
seatbelt) or at a set dollar amount.51 The dollar amount option might be 
particularly attractive given auto insurance coverage, which tends to have 
determinable award limits. Still another approach would be to adopt a 
guidelines system under which the manufacturer’s crashworthiness 
  
 47 Id. § 14, Reporters’ Note cmt. a. 
 48  Id. 
 49  See, e.g., Bearint ex rel Bearint v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., 389 F.3d 1339, 1346 
(11th Cir. 2004); Polisano v. General Motors Corp., 744 A.2d 679 (N. J. Super. 2000).  
 50  Dannenfelser v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1094 (D. Hawaii 2005) 
(“[T]he line between injuries caused by the primary collision and the secondary collision is rarely so 
clear as to permit a bright-line exclusion.”). 
 51 OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 1116-18 (3d ed. 2000). 
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liability might be reduced or expanded by various percentages based on 
mitigating and exaggerating factors concerning the manufacturer’s own 
misconduct, not based on any necessary relationship with the misconduct 
of another defendant. Finally, if comparisons are made, those 
comparisons might be less anchored to moral blame, and the importance 
of structural liability explained to the jury (as the Restatement suggests 
in a related context).52 
It is impossible to fully evaluate the many options for 
ameliorative doctrines in this Article. However, cases like D’Amario, and 
doctrines developed to alleviate the effects of apportionment on 
substantive doctrines, create an effective method to preserve structural 
liability in the crashworthiness context and highlight the need for further 
review of methods of maintaining structural accountability.  
II.  DEFINING THE BASELINE DUTY OF CARE: CRASHWORTHINESS 
LIABILITY TO THE DRUNK DRIVER 
The more difficult case for preserving crashworthiness liability is 
not when the crashworthiness plaintiff is hit by a drunk driver, but when 
the crashworthiness plaintiff is the drunk driver.  Such was the case in 
Giannini v. Ford Motor Co.53 In Giannini, the plaintiff was leaving a 
restaurant. Although subject to dispute, Giannini claimed that despite 
pressing the brake pedal, her vehicle accelerated uncontrollably, 
slamming into a concrete barrier and a lamp post. Giannini also claimed 
that the seatbelt she was wearing failed to restrain her in the crash, 
causing her injuries. Ford disputed the plaintiff’s story. It claimed instead 
that Giannini did not depress the brake pedal. Furthermore, Ford 
maintained that Giannini either was not wearing her seat belt or would 
have suffered the same injuries even if the seatbelt had not failed. 
Finally, Ford claimed that Giannini’s alcohol consumption that night 
contributed to the accident.54  
In a products liability action against Ford, the District Court of 
Connecticut granted Ford’s motion for summary judgment with respect 
to the brake system’s alleged failure to function properly. However, the 
trial court found sufficient evidence to preserve plaintiff’s claim that the 
seatbelt had malfunctioned in the crash. At the pretrial conference in the 
case, Ford proposed that it would present evidence at trial of the 
plaintiff’s intoxication that led to the single-car accident. The court 
examined the issue closely—should evidence of plaintiff fault in causing 
the initial accident be a defense in a crashworthiness case?55 
  
 52  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PRODS. LIAB. § 16 cmt. f (1998). 
 53 No. 3:05CV244, 2007 WL 3253731 (D. Conn. Nov. 2, 2007). 
 54  Id. at *1. 
 55  Id. at *1-*4. 
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This issue, whether plaintiff fault was a valid defense to a 
crashworthiness claim, was also an important if controversial issue 
addressed in the Restatement Third of Products. The answer to the 
question varied in different drafts of the project. The initial Restatement 
Third of Products embraced the view that a crashworthiness defendant 
owed a duty of care to even negligent or reckless drivers. Accordingly, 
although plaintiff fault would reduce plaintiff recovery in most types of 
products liability actions, plaintiff fault would not reduce the plaintiff’s 
recovery in a crashworthiness case.56 When a car manufacturer had an 
obligation to create a crashworthy vehicle, a jury might find that the 
obligation was met or not met. However, why the plaintiff driver got into 
the accident in the first place—an icy road, talking on a cell phone, or 
driving drunk—wouldn’t enter into the assignment of liability and 
damages against the manufacturer, at least with respect to the enhanced 
portion of the injury.57 
The theory underlying the Restatement Third of Products initial 
position was that “the requirement that an automobile be reasonably 
crashworthy” called for a different rule with respect to plaintiff fault 
defenses.58 “[I]f the risks created by plaintiff’s conduct are within the 
range that justifies crashworthiness protection, plaintiff’s conduct creates 
the very situation in which the plaintiff has a legitimate right to expect 
the automobile to provide reasonable protection.”59 Accordingly, the 
initial draft of the Restatement Third of Products would ignore plaintiff 
fault even though the situation might trouble courts “who find it 
objectionable that drunken drivers or drug abusers be allowed full 
recovery for increased harm.”60 
The position that the Reporters originally espoused on 
crashworthiness and apportionment was subsequently overruled by a 
motion on the floor of the ALI.61 The motion was introduced and 
supported by a member of the defense bar.62 However, the Reporters of 
the Restatement Third of Apportionment also recommended backing 
away from the original rule.63 In light of the carried motion to amend the 
draft, the Restatement Third of Products changed course to provide, 
contrary to its original recommendation, that “the contributory fault of 
the plaintiff in causing an accident that results in defect-related increased 
harm [be] relevant in apportioning responsibility between or among the 
parties, according to applicable apportionment law.”64 In commentary, 
  
 56 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. § 6 cmt. f. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 71 A.L.I. PROC. 203-14 (1994).  
 62 OWEN ET AL., supra note 51, at 1105. 
 63 Id. at 206. 
 64 Id. 
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the Restatement Third of Products acknowledges that this is a 
particularly “difficult issue” and the subject of a “sharp[] split” between 
jurisdictions.65 In a nod to that difficulty, the Restatement Third of 
Products lists as an important factor to the apportionment that a 
crashworthiness requirement “aims to protect persons in circumstances in 
which they are unable to protect themselves.”66  
In Giannini, the Connecticut District Court cited the final rules 
adopted by the Restatement Third of Products and noted the split of 
authority discussed in that document. But while citing the final 
Restatement Third of Products rules, the court adopted the Restatement 
Third of Products’ initial view—that plaintiff negligence leading to the 
underlying accident should not be available as a comparative fault 
defense to the enhanced portion of the injury. Tracking the Restatement 
Third of Products’ original sentiment, the Giannini court reasoned that 
the crashworthiness doctrine presupposes that injuries will occur. In fact, 
the court viewed the duty to protect against enhanced injuries as an 
outgrowth of the inevitability of operator negligence.67 In light of 
foreseeable collisions, “a manufacturer’s duty is that of minimizing the 
injurious effects of contact however caused.”68 Given that definition of 
the defendant’s duty, the court limited the trier of fact’s analysis “to the 
nature and severity of the contact and the object’s response.”69 This focus 
on the crashworthiness issue, not on the origin of the crash, stems from 
the underlying principle that “[a] negligent operator is entitled to the 
same protection against unnecessary injury as the careful user of the 
same product is entitled.”70 
Ironically, in the ten years since the Restatement Third of 
Products was enacted, most of the courts that have cited final 
Restatement Third of Products section 16(f) have not embraced the 
Reporters’ final position.71 A number of recent cases have held that the 
manufacturer’s duty in a crashworthiness case encompasses care for all 
drivers or that evidence of the cause of the initial injury is irrelevant to 
the enhanced injury case.72 However, while the majority of cases decided 
  
 65 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 16, Reporters’ Note, cmt. f 
(1998). 
 66 Id. § 16 cmt. f. 
 67  Ford v. Gianinni, Civil Action No. 3:05cv244, 2007 WL 3253731, at *3-*4 (D. Conn. 
Nov. 2, 2007). 
 68 Id. at *3. 
 69 Id.  
 70 Id. 
 71 See id.; Polisano v. General Motors Corp., 744 A.2d 679 (N. J. Super. 2000); Norwest 
Bank New Mexico, N.A. v. Chrysler Corp., 981 P.2d 1217 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999). But see Davis v. 
Daimler Chrysler Corp., No. HHDX04CV065015721S, 2009 WL 323428 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 
2009).  
 72 See, e.g., Bearint ex rel Bearint v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., 389 F.3d 1339, 1346 
(11th Cir. 2004) (stating that “allowing a jury to allocate some of the fault to the initial tortfeasor 
would partially and unfairly absolve the manufacturer of liability for making a faulty device”); Ricci 
v. AB Volvo, 106 Fed. App’x 573, 574 (9th Cir. 2004); Black v. M & W Gear Co., 269 F.3d 1220, 
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after the Restatement Third of Products was passed adopt the Reporters’ 
original view, some cases have embraced the view taken in the final 
Restatement Third of Products.73  
Again, on one level, the courts’ decisions not to allow plaintiff 
comparative fault defenses conflict with the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts’ formal position. However, at a deeper level, the decisions can be 
seen as a reflection of principles embraced by the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts.  In particular, subsequent doctrines from the Restatement Third of 
Apportionment and the Restatement Third of Physical and Emotional 
Harm suggest limits on the view that plaintiff comparative fault must 
always serve as a defense. In particular, subsequent Restatement Third of 
Physical and Emotional Harm provisions adopt “plaintiff no-duty rules” 
rules that bar plaintiff comparative fault defenses in light of special 
reasons of principle or policy.74  
A plaintiff with a high level of fault, such as a drunk driver, 
whose conduct might appropriately be sanctioned in any number of 
ways, would seem an unlikely prospect for special reasons of principle or 
policy to bar a comparative fault defense. Why might the tort law 
recognize an interest in allowing a highly blameworthy plaintiff to 
recover from a product manufacturer? 
A previous examination of cases in which state courts bar 
plaintiff comparative fault claims after the turn to comparative fault 
defenses suggests that courts limit plaintiff fault defenses based on six 
different types of principle or policy considerations.75 Two of these 
policy rationales are particularly salient in the context of a drunk driver’s 
crashworthiness claim.   
First, courts sometimes limit plaintiff fault defenses in structural 
safety cases—when systemic differentials in knowledge, experience, or 
control suggest that the defendant can take better care of the plaintiff’s 
safety than can the plaintiff herself. The cases involve defendants who 
can foresee that some people in plaintiff’s position will not exercise 
adequate self-care, and the defendants can control system-wide decisions 
to ensure greater safety for the group.  
In the crashworthiness cases, barring plaintiff comparative fault 
claims may well promote greater driver and passenger safety. While 
driving under the influence of alcohol is dangerous and distressing, 
  
1236 (10th Cir. 2001); Gianinni v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:05CV244 (SRU), 2007 WL 3253731, at 
*3-*4 (D. Conn. Nov. 2, 2007); Dannenfelser v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 
1095 (D. Haw. 2005); Green v. General Motors, 709 A.2d 205 (N.J. Super. 1998); see also OWEN ET 
AL., supra note 51, at 1106 n.33 (citing a trial court opinion of Judge Posner’s).  
 73 See, e.g., Smith v. Toyota Motor Corp., 105 Fed. App’x 47, 50 (6th Cir. 2004); Davis, 
2009 WL 323428; Bravo v. Ford Motor Co., 29 Conn. L. Rptr. 676 (Conn. Super. 2001). 
 74  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL HARM § 7 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 
2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 3; see, e.g., Christensen v. 
Royal School Dist. No. 160, 124 P.3d 283 (Wash. 2005) (employing plaintiff no duty rules in the 
context of a teen victim of sexual abuse). 
 75 Bublick, supra note 3, at 989-90. 
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accidents from that conduct are certainly foreseeable. In fact, impaired 
driving is the single greatest risk factor for injury-producing automobile 
accidents.76 Given the great foreseeable risk and the defendant’s control 
over systemic safety decisions about driver and passenger protection, 
courts may feel that efforts to heighten plaintiff care through comparative 
fault defenses might be counterproductive to driver and passenger safety 
by undermining more important incentives for defendant care. 77  
Another policy factor that courts have recognized as a limit on 
comparative fault defenses is one related to the role of the defendant.  At 
times, even when defendants are not better situated than are plaintiffs to 
provide care for plaintiffs’ safety, courts may limit plaintiff fault 
defenses so that defendants cannot litigate away contractual or social 
obligations of care for even a faulty plaintiff. In this category, limits are 
placed on defendants’ use of comparative fault defenses in order to set 
baseline levels of care owed to even plaintiffs guilty of wrongdoing. 
Often, these cases involve a plaintiff’s right to receive subsequent aid.  
This sort of principle and policy limit may apply to 
crashworthiness cases with drunk drivers. A person who drinks and 
drives may legitimately face many types of adverse consequences. The 
driver might have her driver’s license revoked, get into an accident and 
be jailed, be fined or required to pay tort damages, or be injured or killed 
herself. But even with all of these potential consequences, the drunk 
driver may still have some entitlements to care from others. For example, 
doctors must provide adequate emergency care,78 which may not be 
negligent.79 Moreover, police may not abuse the driver.80  
A manufacturer’s obligation to provide crashworthiness 
protection appears to fit within this category of subsequent protection 
owed to an even negligent or reckless person. The clearest analogy may 
be to a doctor’s obligation to provide non-negligent care to patients who 
were injured by their own fault. In the medical context, if a patient 
causes his own injury by drunk driving, a doctor cannot assert the 
plaintiff’s negligence in causing the accident as a basis for a comparative 
fault claim in an action for subsequent malpractice.81  
  
 76  See supra notes 29, 31 and accompanying text.  
 77 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 65, at 452 (W. Page 
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (“It has been said that . . . the rule [of contributory negligence] is intended 
to discourage accidents by denying recovery to those who fail to use proper care for their own safety. 
But the assumption that the speeding motorist is, or should be meditating on the possible failure of a 
lawsuit for his possible injuries appears contrary to human experience; and it might be as reasonable 
to say that the rule promotes accidents by encouraging the negligent defendant to hope that the 
person he injures will be negligent too.”). 
 78 Lewellen v. Schneck Med. Ctr., No. 4:05-CV-00083-JDT-WGH, 2007 WL 2363384, 
at *5 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 2007). 
 79 Mercer v. Vanderbilt Univ., 134 S.W.3d 121, 130 (Tenn. 2004); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 7 cmt. m (2000).  
 80 See City of Hobbs v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 576, 579 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(comparative fault does not apply to section 1983 action). 
 81 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 7 cmt. m (2000). 
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The special rule excluding comparative-fault defenses in these 
cases can be understood in part by the nature of the duty to provide 
rescue protections that could not be waived by contract. A thought 
experiment might be useful here. Imagine that a car dealer knows that 
five of its cars have airbags that have a high risk of failing to open on 
impact in a collision. Anticipating potential liability but not wanting to 
pay for repairs, the dealer decides to sell the defective cars only to people 
known to be alcoholics because with comparative fault, the damage 
payouts will be slight. Would the dealer be permitted to make such a 
calculation?  
Even if the dealer gave adequate disclosure of the defect to the 
specific purchasers, such a decision would violate the dealer’s legal and 
contractual obligations. Laws requiring car makers to provide airbags in 
all cars after a certain date are designed to minimize injuries to drivers 
and passengers as a whole, not only to careful drivers.  
Similarly, a doctor could not tell a patient that she was going to 
exercise less care than she would for other patients because of the 
patient’s prior carelessness for her own health. The policy interest here is 
in providing a level of care to all patients, not just those who have 
occasioned their injuries and illnesses without fault. 
Plaintiff no-duty rules may not have been applied to comparative 
fault claims in crashworthiness cases in part because these rules were not 
well-developed or defined at the time the Restatement Third of Products 
was enacted. There is no reason that plaintiff no-duty rules could not be 
used to reach the result reached by the court in Giannini. If plaintiff no-
duty rules are applied, the plaintiff may recover in full from the 
manufacturer for the crashworthiness case.  
But the potential for adopting plaintiff no-duty rules to the 
crashworthiness and drunk driving context is not an open-and-shut case. 
The shift to comparative fault from contributory negligence not only 
undermines but was meant to undermine all-or-nothing results.82 With 
both parties in the case at fault to some degree, contemporary norms 
suggest some form of splitting.  
While splitting is plausible in theory, the history of 
apportionment cases in this area provides less reassurance that splitting is 
a feasible option. In practice, when courts ask juries to apportion 
responsibility between a crashworthiness defendant and a drunk driver, 
comparison of the two types of conduct seems generally to resemble a 
no-liability rule for the crashworthiness defendant.83 Even if a product 
defect causes injury to the plaintiff, when faced with the moral 
blameworthiness of a drunk driver, it is not clear that juries can balance 
structural safety interests in maintaining crashworthy vehicles with moral 
blame for drunk drivers. Instead, the many 100-0 results in cases 
  
 82 See id. § 3 cmt. b. 
 83 See, e.g., D’Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So. 2d 424, 437 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam).  
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involving one highly blameworthy party suggests that plaintiff’s highly 
blameworthy conduct may swamp all other factors.84 
In essence then, when juries compare a plaintiff’s reckless 
conduct and a defendant’s failure to design a crashworthy vehicle, the 
plaintiff may well be tort-proof. This is true even though the injuries are 
not, in the words of one famous case, “entirely” the fault of the 
plaintiff.85 For courts that want to preserve some crashworthiness liability 
even to reckless parties, comparative apportionment becomes a poor 
option. Plaintiff no-duty rules, or the equivalent doctrine, refusing to 
apportion fault between the causes of the first and second collision, 
preserves a more robust doctrine of crashworthiness liability.  
There are other viable options for creating a real split solution. 
One would be to proceed as seatbelt cases do, with fixed percentage 
reductions for plaintiff fault.  However, this sort of compromise would 
have to be drawn by legislative solution. Given political currents, 
however, plaintiffs may not receive anything under these statutes either.86  
A different option would be to allow reckless plaintiffs to obtain 
full recovery in cases involving manufacturing defects, which are often 
more clear in terms of wrongs done to the plaintiff, and an apportioned 
(or typically zero recovery) in design defect cases. 
CONCLUSION 
The Restatement Third of Products has now turned ten. In terms 
of the project’s contribution to products liability defenses, there is much 
to celebrate. The project’s framework of causal and then fault 
apportionment is conceptually clear and analytically sound.87 The 
disappearance of special defenses like misuse promises to simplify 
adjudication.88 The removal of disclaimers as a bar to liability reduces 
manufacturers’ ability to waive liability to uninformed consumers who, 
for the most part, do not consciously choose added product risk.89 And 
where fault lines emerge in the case law, the Reporters not only mark 
those hazards, but supply cogent explanations of the various routes that 
might be taken.  
  
 84 Richard C. Ausness, Products Liability’s Parallel Universe: Fault-Based Liability 
Theories and Modern Products Liability Law, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 635 (2009) (discussing ways in 
which courts avoid comparative apportionment and revert to all-or-nothing solutions when plaintiffs 
are guilty of highly blameworthy conduct).  
 85 Butterfield v. Forrester, (1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 927 (K.B.) (U.K.).  
 86 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 337.195 (West 2006). 
 87 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. §§ 16, 17 (1998). 
 88 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 370, at 1026-29 (2000). 
 89 As Mark Geistfeld shows in the context of products liability and Ken Simons 
demonstrates in the broader context of assumption of risk, a small number of consumers may 
actually choose added risk. See generally Mark A. Geistfeld, The Value of Consumer Choice in 
Products Liability, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 781 (2009); Kenneth W. Simons, Assumption of Risk and 
Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory of Full Preference, 67 B.U. L. REV. 213 (1987).  
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Yet, as this round of celebrations ends, a wish for the future 
seems in order. After ten years of case law following the Restatement 
Third of Products and a more complete Restatement (Third) of Torts 
project, it is time to reexamine how structural liability can survive the 
advent of comparative apportionment’s inclusion of highly blameworthy 
torts. Crashworthiness cases with drunk drivers are the first example.  
In part, the need for reexamination of the structural liability issue 
stems from the fragmentary nature of the Restatement (Third) of Torts 
project. From the beginning of the project, the American Law Institute 
made an important decision that the subject of Torts had “become too 
broad and too intricate to be encompassed in a single project.”90 The 
decision to proceed in “segments” was pragmatic, perhaps essential to 
the project’s completion.91 But now that three segments are complete—
the Restatement Third of Products in 1998,92 the Restatement Third of 
Apportionment in 2000,93 and the Restatement Third of Physical and 
Emotional Harm, likely in this coming year94—questions of fit remain.  
If the Restatement (Third) of Torts meant to obliterate structural 
liability it could have staked this position in an outright claim. But it will 
be unfortunate if this is truly the way crashworthiness liability ends, not 
with a bang but a whimper.  
  
 90 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. 
LIAB., at xv, xv (1998). 
 91 Id. 
 92 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (1998). 
 93 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. (2000). 
 94 Maintaining Our Collaborative Culture in an Online Community, THE A.L.I. 
REPORTER (A.L.I., Philadelphia, Pa), Winter 2009, at 1, 4; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).  
